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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is the opening brief of Gordon Sylte, Susan Goodrich, John Sylte, and Sylte Ranch
Limited Liability Company (collectively, “Sylte”) in Appeal No. 46062-2018. On appeal, Sylte
challenges the District Court’s affirmation of the final agency action of the Idaho Department of
Water Resources (“IDWR” or the “Department”).
This case involves the administration of Sylte’s water right no. 95-0734, whose 1875
priority date makes it the most senior water right in Water District 95C (“WD 95C”), the Twin
Lakes-Rathdrum Creek water system in Kootenai County, Idaho. All of the water rights in WD
95C were conclusively determined in a general stream adjudication that ended in 1989.
In 2016, the Department issued guidance to the WD 95C Watermaster concerning
administration of water rights in the district under the 1989 decree. This guidance (known as the
“Instructions”) effectively and improperly authorized the Watermaster to satisfy upstream junior
water rights before Sylte’s 1875 right.
Sylte challenged the Instructions before the Department and on judicial review to the
District Court. In this appeal, Sylte asks this Court to reverse the Department’s and District
Court’s affirmation of the Instructions.
The facts concerning the nature of water rights and the water system in WD 95C are set
forth in extensive findings and conclusions made by the adjudication court in 1989. These are
described in detail in Section III below.
In summary, when Sylte’s right no. 95-0734 was appropriated in 1875, the source of the
appropriation—Rathdrum Creek—was a year-round natural stream continuously supplied with
water from the upstream natural lake formation then known as Fish Lakes (now known as Twin
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Lakes). Around 1906, a dam was constructed at Twin Lakes’ outlet to Rathdrum Creek—the
lakes’ only natural outlet. This dam did not raise the water elevation in Twin Lakes, but instead
merely served to hold water in Twin Lakes longer during the summer than before it was built. In
other words, Twin Lakes emptied faster into Rathdrum Creek in summer prior to 1906 than after.
Put yet another way, in summers prior to 1906, water flowed out of Twin Lakes faster than it
entered, thus resulting in receding water levels.
WD 95C was established after the general stream adjudication concluded in 1989. For
many years, WD 95C operated without written guidance from the Department. Then, in
September 2016, the Department issued its Instructions to the Watermaster. Among other things,
the Instructions required that outflows to Rathdrum Creek from Twin Lakes to satisfy Sylte’s
1875 right be limited to Twin Lakes’ inflow. This requirement is contrary to how the water
system naturally functioned in 1875, and it allows the satisfaction of upstream junior water rights
ahead of Sylte’s 1875 right by allowing junior water rights (including the 1906 storage water
rights associated with Twin Lakes’ dam) to reduce Twin Lakes’ historical natural outflow to
Rathdrum Creek.
Sylte now asks this Court to determine that the prior decree and Idaho’s Prior
Appropriation Doctrine protect Sylte’s 1875 right from interference by junior upstream water
rights.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
A.

Sylte’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling

On February 16, 2017, Sylte filed its Petition for Declaratory Ruling (“IDWR Petition”)
with the Department pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5232 and IDAPA 37.01.01.400, asking
the Department to: (1) set aside and reverse the Instructions on grounds that the Instructions are
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contrary to a prior decree and are not in accordance with the Prior Appropriation Doctrine as
required by Idaho Code Section 42-602; and (2) determine that the prior appropriation doctrine
and the prior decree require that administration of Sylte’s water right no. 95-0734, including the
application of the futile call doctrine, are not limited by the amount of natural tributary inflow to
Twin Lakes. (R. 317; A.R. 213-74). 1
After Sylte filed its IDWR Petition, numerous individuals and entities—including
Intervenors/Respondents Twin Lakes Flood Control District No. 17 (“FCD”) and the Twin Lakes
Improvement Association (“TLIA”)—filed petitions to intervene. (A.R. 333-660). 2
On June 26, 2017, Sylte filed a motion for summary judgment together with a supporting
brief and affidavit. (A.R. 900-06 (Sylte’s Motion for Summary Judgment), 907-35 (Sylte’s
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment), and 936-1190 (Affidavit of Michael
P. Lawrence)). Sylte’s summary judgment motion argued that because all facts material to the
questions presented in the IDWR Petition were conclusively determined in the prior adjudication,
there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that Sylte was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law in its favor. (A.R. 908).

1

The District Court Clerk’s record on appeal (designated as “R.” in this brief’s citations)
incorporates the Agency Record & Transcript (10-20-17) as lodged with the District Court which was
provided on a separate CD in the record on appeal. R. 317. The Agency Record comprises documents
labeled 000001-001475. To avoid confusion between the two records, this brief’s citations to the Agency
Record will be designated as “A.R.” without further reference to R. 317. Following the “R.” or “A.R.”,
citations include page numbers from each record with preceding zeros eliminated.
2

A large number of individuals and entities (over 70) filed petitions to intervene in the IDWR
Petition matter. Some were granted intervention and others were denied intervention or defaulted. (See,
e.g., A.R. 643-50; 811-17). Most parties designated TLIA and its attorney as their spokesperson in the
proceeding. (See e.g., A.R. 862-64).
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Sylte’s summary judgment motion was opposed by Intervenors Colby Clark and TLIA.
(A.R. 1205, 1259-74). In addition, TLIA filed its own cross-motion for summary judgment.
(A.R. 1255-58 (original cross-motion); 1277-80 (amended cross-motion).
On September 6, 2017, following additional briefing by Sylte (A.R. 1283-1307, 132536), the Department issued its Order on Motions for Summary Judgment; Order Amending
Instructions; Order Vacating Hearing Dates and Schedule (“IDWR Order”). (A.R. 1390-1407). 3
Citing and quoting documents not in the record, the IDWR Order denied Sylte’s motion for
summary judgment, granted TLIA’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and sua sponte
amended the Instructions to include language authorizing the delivery of water to water right no.
95-0734 “unless or until the maximum annual diversion volume of 4.1 acre-feet has been
delivered.” (A.R. 1402).
On October 3, 2017, Sylte timely filed its Petition for Judicial Review of Agency Action
(“Judicial Review Petition”) of the Department’s order in the District Court for the First Judicial
District in Kootenai County. (A.R. 1437-47; R. 7-17).

3

On September 7, 2017, the Department issued a letter (“Letter”) identifying the IDWR Order as
a “final action of the agency” instead of a preliminary order (as the IDWR Order was originally
identified). (A.R. 1408-11.) On September 20, 2017, because of the ambiguity as to whether the IDWR
Order was a final action or preliminary order, and in an effort to ensure exhaustion of administrative
remedies, Sylte filed with the Director of IDWR Sylte’s Appeal, Exceptions, Request for Reconsideration
and Clarification, and Request for Hearing (“Sylte’s Exceptions”) (A.R. 1412-36). IDWR decided none
of the matters raised in Sylte’s Exceptions, including issues concerning whether the Letter properly
designated the IDWR Order as a final agency action. The Department’s counsel instead orally confirmed
to Sylte’s counsel that the Department considered the IDWR Order to be a final agency action which
Sylte had properly and timely appealed to the District Court by filing a petition for judicial review.
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B.

Sylte’s Petition for Judicial Review

On October 4, 2017, pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court’s December 9, 2009
Administrative Order, Sylte’s Judicial Review Petition was reassigned to the presiding judge of
the Snake River Basin Adjudication Court of the Fifth Judicial District. (R. 18-21).
On March 20, 2018, following briefing by Sylte (R. 63-112, 192-219), IDWR (R. 15279), FCD (R. 181-91), and TLIA (R. 131-50), the District Court heard oral argument on Sylte’s
Judicial Review Petition. (R. 220-21). A copy of that hearing’s transcript is included in the
record on appeal.
On April 11, 2018, the District Court issued its Judgment (R. 222-25) and Memorandum
Decision (“Judicial Review Decision”) (R. 226-38) affirming the IDWR Order.
On May 2, 2018, Sylte timely filed with the District Court Petitioner Sylte’s Petition for
Rehearing (R. 239-43), and on May 16, 2018, Sylte timely filed its memorandum in support (R.
244-52) challenging the District Court’s determination that Sylte’s substantial rights were not
prejudiced by the language added to the Instructions by the IDWR Order.
On May 23, 2018, Sylte timely filed with the District Court Sylte’s Notice of Appeal (R.
253-77) of the District Court’s Judicial Review Decision.
On June 5, 2018, the District Court issued its Order Denying [Sylte’s] Petition for
Rehearing (“Rehearing Denial”). (R. 278-81).
On July 16, 2018, Sylte timely filed with the District Court Sylte’s Amended Notice of
Appeal (R. 282-94) to include the District Court’s Rehearing Denial in this appeal.
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III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek adjudication

In 1975, a general stream adjudication commenced to determine rights to the use of the
surface waters of Twin Lakes, including tributaries and outlets (i.e. Rathdrum Creek). (A.R.
196).
On January 14, 1985, after water users filed their various claims, the Department issued
its Proposed Finding of Water Rights in the Twin Lakes – Rathdrum Creek Drainage Basin
(“Proposed Findings”). (A.R. 1-172). Among other things, the Proposed Findings included
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (A.R. 14-21) and a listing of proposed water
rights (A.R. 22-115). A number of water users, including Sylte, filed objections to the Proposed
Findings. (A.R. 174-75).
On February 22, 1989, following a court trial, First Judicial District Court Judge Richard
Magnuson issued his Memorandum Decision (“Memorandum Decision”) in the adjudication.
(A.R. 173-95). Among other things, Judge Magnuson’s Memorandum Decision made extensive
findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the nature of the water system and the
development of water rights on the system—in particular, Sylte’s 1875 right no. 95-0734 and the
1906 storage rights associated with Twin Lakes and the dam constructed at its outlet (which are
described in more detail in the next subsection of this brief). Memorandum Decision at 9-21
(A.R. 181-93). Judge Magnuson ultimately determined that it was necessary to “amend the
Director’s [Proposed Findings] to reflect and effectuate this Court’s determinations regarding
No. 95-0734 [i.e. Sylte’s 1875 right], as set forth in this memorandum decision.” Memorandum
Decision at 21 (A.R. 193). Accordingly, he instructed the Department to “prepare drafts of such
proposed amendments.” Id.
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On April 19, 1989, Judge Magnuson issued his Final Decree (A.R. 196-209) (“Final
Decree”) in which he “adopted [the Memorandum Decision] as findings of fact and conclusions
of law” and incorporated it by reference. Final Decree at 2-3 (A.R. 197-98). The Final Decree
also adopted and incorporated the Department’s Proposed Findings as amended by the
Memorandum Decision. Final Decree at 3 (A.R. 198). He attached to the Final Decree a copy
of the Department’s amended portions of the Proposed Findings’ Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (the “Amended Proposed Findings”), with insertions underlined and
deletions struck through. 4
Following the entry of the 1989 Decree, on August 7, 1989, the Department issued an
Order Creating Water District establishing WD 95C. (See A.R. 1166).
B.

The Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek water system

In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Magnuson found that Twin Lakes originated as a
natural body of water comprised of two lakes joined by a channel which flows from the upper
lake to the lower lake, that it is fed by upstream tributaries, and that its only natural outlet was
(and is) Rathdrum Creek.
Twin Lakes, originally known as Fish Lakes, is a body of water
comprised of two lakes joined by a channel which flows from the upper lake to
the lower lake. Fish Creek is the major tributary feeding Twin Lakes, and
there are a number of smaller tributaries which also feed the lakes, some of
which flow into the Upper Lake and some of which flow into the Lower Lake.
Rathdrum Creek is the only outlet from the lakes, and it begins at the lower
end of Twin Lakes and flows southwesterly to Rathdrum Prairie.
Memorandum Decision at 9 (A.R. 181).
4

In this brief, the term “1989 Decree” means the combination of the Final Decree (including its
attached Amended Proposed Findings), together with the Memorandum Decision and Proposed Findings
(as amended by the Memorandum Decision) which, as described in the main text, were incorporated into
the Final Decree.
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He also found that Rathdrum Creek historically furnished water to Rathdrum Creek in
amounts sufficient to supply Sylte’s 1875 water right on a continuous, year-round basis.
This Court finds at the time the John Sylte and Evelyn Sylte Water
Right #95-0734 was created in 1875 there was sufficient direct flow water in
Rathdrum Creek, in its then natural condition, furnished from the water of
Twin (Fish) Lakes, to provide .07 cubic foot per second to the appropriator on
a continuous year-round basis.
Memorandum Decision at 11 (A.R. 183). Some distance past Sylte’s diversion, Rathdrum Creek
disappeared into a sink area. Memorandum Decision at 9 (A.R. 183).
Around 1900, Twin Lakes’ natural features were altered and a dam was installed for the
purpose of making water available for irrigation past Sylte’s diversion in Rathdrum Prairie.
Sometime around the turn of the century, the Spokane Valley Land &
Water Company modified the natural features of the lakes for purposes of
making water available for irrigation use in Rathdrum Prairie. The natural
channel connecting the lakes was widened and deepened, and a dam and outlet
structure was constructed at the lower end of Lower Twin Lake which enabled
a portion of the water stored in Lower Twin Lake to be released downstream to
Rathdrum Creek.
Memorandum Decision at 9 (A.R. 181). The dam and outlet structure initiated the appropriation
of two 1906 storage rights in Twin Lakes, which are described further in the next subsection of
this brief.
The dam did not result in the storage of any additional volume of water in Twin Lakes.
Instead, it served to hold the water in Twin Lakes at a higher point longer during the summer
months than had naturally occurred before the dam was installed.
The water level of Twin Lakes and the vegetation lines around the
lakes were relatively the same, both before and after the construction of the
dam. The primary result the dam had on the water level was to hold the water
at a higher point longer through the summer months.
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Memorandum Decision at 10 (A.R. 182). This was reflected in the amendments to the Proposed
Findings attached to the Final Decree by changing Finding of Fact No. 10 to reflect that all three
“blocks” of water in Twin Lakes were natural lake storage prior to dam construction, and striking
language stating that the dam and outlet structure “provided the capability to raise the level of the
lakes.” Final Decree at xv-xvi (A.R. 201-02) (Amended Proposed Findings’ Finding of Fact No.
10). 5
Prior to the 1906 dam at Twin Lakes’ outlet, water flowed over and through the lakes’
natural obstruction into Rathdrum Creek:
Rathdrum Creek is the only natural outlet to Twin Lakes; however, the
parties were not in agreement as to whether the outflow of Lower Twin Lakes
(pre-dam construction) went over the top of the lip of Lower Twin Lakes at its
lowest point, or whether its outlet was under water, surfacing to the top of the
land at [a] lower level to form Rathdrum Creek, or whether it flowed over the
top of the lip during periods of high water only and continued for the rest of
the time underground as a spring.
In any event, before the dam was built the outflow water flowed in
Rathdrum Creek for about four miles downstream to the John Sylte (#95-0734)
place of diversion. Thereafter it flowed into a sink area and went back into the
ground. . . .
From conflicting evidence, this Court finds it was more probably true
than not that the outlet waters of Twin Lakes flowed over the top of the lip at
periods of high water and through the natural pre-dam obstruction at all times,
forming the source waters of Rathdrum Creek.
Memorandum Decision at 10-11 (A.R. 182-83).
Based on these findings, Judge Magnuson found:

5

Finding of Fact No. 10 in the Amended Proposed Findings describes three “blocks” of water in
Twin Lakes. The first “block” of water, which has no associated water right, is “the natural lake storage
located between the bottom of the lake and Staff Gauge height 0.0 feet . . . .” Final Decree at xv (R. at
201-02) (Amended Proposed Findings’ Finding of Fact No. 10.a). The second and third “blocks” of
water, which are located above 0.0 on the Staff Gauge and are associated with Twin Lakes’ storage water
rights (described in the next subsection), also were “at one time part of the natural lake storage, but [were]
made available for appropriation by excavation of the outlet from Lower Twin Lakes.” Final Decree at
xv-xvi (R. at 201-02) (Amended Proposed Findings’ Finding of Fact No. 10.b and 10.c).
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[A]t the time the John Sylte and Evelyn Sylte Water Right #95-0734 was
created in 1875 there was sufficient direct flow water in Rathdrum Creek, in its
then natural condition, furnished from the water of Twin (Fish) Lakes, to
provide .07 cubic foot per second to the appropriator on a continuous yearround basis.
Memorandum Decision at 11 (A.R. 183). And he concluded:
The holders of water right #95-0734 are therefore entitled to waters from
the source of their appropriation on a basis of priority over those storage rights
Nos. 95-0974 and 95-0975. The waters of this basin are to be administered in
such manner as to give effect to such priority.
Memorandum Decision at 13 (A.R. 185).
C.

The Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek water rights

Judge Magnuson found that Sylte holds water right no. 95-0734—a 0.07 cfs year-round
stockwater right diverted from Rathdrum Creek (tributary to Sinks) with a May 1, 1875 priority
date. (A.R. 26). 6 It is not an instream stockwater right; rather it has a point of diversion located
on Rathdrum Creek downstream from the outlet of Twin Lakes. Id. It is the most senior water
right in WD 95C.
Judge Magnuson also confirmed a number of water rights in WD 95C that are junior to
Sylte’s 1875 water right, many of which are diverted upstream from Sylte’s right. Two of these
upstream junior water rights are storage rights associated with Twin Lakes: nos. 95-0973 and
95-0974 (together, the “1906 Storage Rights”), which are 1906 priority storage water rights
currently held by Intervenors/Respondents Twin Lakes Flood Control District No. 17 (“FCD”)
and the Twin Lakes Improvement Association (“TLIA”), respectively. (A.R. 45). 7

6

Water right no. 95-0734 was decreed to John and Evelyn Sylte. Proposed Findings at 3 (A.R.
26). Their son, Gordon Sylte, is the manager of Sylte Ranch Limited Liability Company, the current
claimant of water right no. 95-0734 in the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication.
7

At places in the Memorandum Decision, Judge Magnuson mistakenly referred to the 1906
Storage Rights as nos. 95-0974 and 95-0975 (instead of -973). See, e.g., Memorandum Decision at 15
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TLIA’s right no. 95-0974 authorizes storage of up to 5,360 acre-feet in Twin Lakes at
lake levels between 0.0 feet and 6.4 feet on a staff gauge. (A.R. 45). FCD’s right no. 95-0973
authorizes storage of up to 3,730 acre-feet in Twin Lakes at lake levels between 6.4 feet and 10.4
feet on the staff gauge. (A.R. 45). These are two of the “blocks” of storage water described in
Amended Proposed Findings’ Finding of Fact No. 10, the third “block” being water below 0.0
feet on the staff gauge. See supra note 5. The 1906 Storage Rights are authorized to hold water
in storage year-round, but they can only fill (i.e. capture water) between November 1 and March
31. (A.R. 45). These two storage water rights are the only storage rights on the Twin LakesRathdrum Creek system. (A.R. 187).
D.

The 2016 IDWR Instructions

For many years after WD 95C was created following the entry of the Final Decree, water
rights in WD 95C were administered without written guidance from the Department. (A.R.
1177). Then, in 2016, following complaints by a WD 95C water user, the Department sent a
letter (the “Instructions”) to the WD 95C Watermaster “[t]o clarify [his] duties as watermaster
and resolve any potential discrepancies between [his] regulation and the legal requirements of
the Decree.” Instructions at 1 (A.R. 210). 8 They stated that the Watermaster “must administer
water rights according to these instructions, which are subject to further review and updates by

(A.R. 187). This apparently inadvertent error has been undisputed throughout these proceedings. The
Proposed Findings clearly state that water rights nos. 95-0974 and 95-0973 were the storage rights in
Twin Lakes decreed to TLIA and the U.S. Bureau or Reclamation (“Bureau”), respectively. Proposed
Findings at 21 (A.R. 45). The Bureau subsequently conveyed its interest in water right no. 95-0973 to
FCD. The 1989 Decree determined water right no. 95-0975 to be disallowed. (A.R. 207).
8

The Instructions were issued in response to a letter to IDWR from Mr. Colby Clark complaining
about the Watermaster. Instructions at 1 (A.R. 210). Also because of Mr. Clark’s letter, the Department
initiated a proceeding to remove the Watermaster, which resulted in an order removing the Watermaster.
(A.R. 1161-82).

APPELLANT SYLTE’S OPENING BRIEF –APPEAL NO. 46062 (OCT. 23, 2018)
14380981_15.doc / 13461-4

Page 16 of 49

the Department.” Instructions at 3 (A.R. 212). The Instructions were the Department’s first ever
written guidance concerning the distribution of water in WD 95C. (A.R. 1177).
Among other things, the Instructions limit the outflow of water from Twin Lakes to
Rathdrum Creek—and thus the amount of water capable of delivery to Sylte’s 1875 water right
no. 95-0734—to the total natural tributary inflow into Twin Lakes:
4)
From April 1 to October 31 of each year, the watermaster will
measure the total natural tributary inflow to Twin Lakes (weekly) and allow
diversion of up to that amount by the direct flow water rights on the basis of water
right priority. See Decree at Conclusion of Law 12.
5)
From April 1 to October 31 each year, when seepage and
evaporation losses from Twin Lakes exceed the total natural tributary inflow to
Twin Lakes (as determined by decreasing lake level), no water will be released
from the lakes to satisfy Rathdrum Creek water rights, except for water right no.
95-734. Decree at Conclusions of Law 12, 14; Memorandum Decision at 12-13.
When this occurs, all or a portion of the total natural tributary inflow to Twin
Lakes, as measured by the watermaster, can be released to satisfy delivery of
water right no. 95-734 with 0.07 cfs at the legal point of diversion. If all of the
natural inflow must be released to satisfy water right no. 95-734, the watermaster
shall curtail all junior direct flow water rights. If only a portion of the inflow is
released to satisfy water right no. 95-734, the watermaster shall satisfy water
rights that divert from Twin Lakes and its tributaries using the remainder of the
natural flow, on the basis of water right priority.
6)
From April 1 to October 31 of each year, when seepage and
evaporation losses from Twin Lakes do not exceed the total natural tributary
inflow (as determined by steady or increasing lake level), the watermaster shall
distribute the total natural tributary inflow to water rights that divert from Twin
Lakes and its tributaries and Rathdrum Creek on the basis of water right priority.
See Decree at Conclusions of Law 12, 14.
Instructions at 2 (A.R. 211) (underlining added).
In addition, the Instructions require a futile call determination if the release to Rathdrum
Creek of Twin Lakes’ natural tributary inflow does not satisfy Sylte’s 1875 water right no. 950734:
7)
If release of all of the natural tributary inflow does not satisfy
delivery of water right no. 95-734 within a 48-hr period, the watermaster shall
consult with the Department's Northern Regional Manager or designated
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Department representative, regarding determination of a futile call with respect
to delivery of water right no. 95-734. The Department's Northern Regional
Manager will issue written notice to the watermaster regarding the futile call
determination. A futile call determination will result in nondelivery of water
right no. 95-734.
Instructions at 2 (A.R. 211) (underlining added).
As already described, Sylte petitioned the Department to reverse the Instructions’
requirement that only the amount of Twin Lakes’ inflow can be released to Rathdrum Creek to
satisfy Sylte’s 1875 right.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Sylte presents the following issues on appeal, followed by Sylte’s proposed resolution in
brackets:
a.

Did the District Court err when it affirmed the IDWR Order approving and

amending the Instructions? [Yes.]
b.

Did the District Court err by failing to consider issues and arguments raised by

Sylte on judicial review? [Yes.]
c.

Did the District Court err by upholding the Department’s determination that

releases of water from Twin Lakes to satisfy Sylte’s 1875 water right no. 95-0734 should be
limited to the amount of inflow to Twin Lakes? [Yes.]
d.

Did the District Court err by upholding the Department’s review and citation to

documents outside the agency record? [Yes.]
e.

Did the District Court err by upholding the Department’s sua sponte order in the

IDWR Order directing the addition of language to the Instructions requiring the distribution of
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water to Sylte’s 1875 water right no. 95-0734 “unless or until the maximum annual diversion
volume of 4.1 acre feet has been delivered”? [Yes.]
f.

Did the District Court err by denying Sylte’s Petition for Rehearing on grounds

that Sylte’s substantial rights were not prejudiced by the Department’s addition of language to
the Instructions described in preceding issue? [Yes.]
g.

Is Sylte entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs in the proceedings below

and on appeal? [Yes.]
ATTORNEY FEES
Sylte seeks an award of its attorney fees and costs, in full or in part, on this appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117(1) and 12-117(2) and Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(5), 40, and
41.
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) authorizes awards of attorney fees to the “prevailing party” in a
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency and a person, when “the nonprevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” This Court has recognized that Idaho
Code § 12–117 authorizes fees to the prevailing party on appeal. City of Osburn v. Randel, 152
Idaho 906, 910, 277 P.3d 353, 357 (2012). “The Court employs a two-part test for I.C. § 12–117
on appeal: the party seeking fees must be the prevailing party and the losing party must have
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” Id.
When those tests are met, the award is mandatory. Fuchs v. Idaho State Police, Alcohol
Beverage Control, 153 Idaho 114, 117, 279 P.3d 100, 103 (2012). Idaho Code § 12-117(2)
authorizes awards of attorney fees to the prevailing party “on a portion of the case” if the
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nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of
the case.
Sylte is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs to the extent they prevail on any
issues because, as demonstrated below, the IDWR Order and Instructions are contrary to the
1989 Decree and Idaho’s Prior Appropriation Doctrine and they deprive Sylte’s senior water
right of the benefit of its priority. At all stages of these proceedings Sylte has maintained that the
plain language of the 1989 Decree does not limit the exercise of water right no. 95-0734 to Twin
Lakes’ tributary inflow. Sylte also has consistently argued that water right no. 95-0734’s senior
priority protects it from interference or injury by junior water rights—a simple and fundamental
principle of Idaho water law. Nevertheless, despite Judge Magnuson’s admonition that “[t]o
accept the department’s interpretation of the facts as they pertain to the 1875 Sylte water right
(#95-0734), would be to deprive the holders of such water right of the use of the water to which
they are entitled and to which use they have a prior right to those possessing the storage rights.”
Memorandum Decision at 14 (A.R. 186), the Department’s Order and Instructions include
provisions which would do exactly that. There is no basis in law or fact for the Department or
the Intervenors to have taken the positions that have led to this litigation.
The Department and the Intervenors have ignored Sylte’s arguments and the findings and
conclusions of Judge Magnuson and, accordingly, have acted without foundation. Sylte
respectfully requests an award of attorney fees and costs should it prevail in any part of this
appeal.
The District Court denied Sylte’s request for attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code §
12-117 because Sylte did not prevail on judicial review. Judicial Review Decision at 11 (R.
236). “This Court reviews a trial court's determination of who is the prevailing party and award
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of attorney fees below for abuse of discretion.” Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 775, 203 P.3d
702, 705 (2009). Should this Court grant Sylte its requested relief, for the same reasons Sylte
argues it is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal, Sylte requests that this
Court find that Sylte should be awarded attorney fees and costs in the District Court proceedings,
and that this Court remand the case to the District Court for a determination of appropriate fees
and costs to be awarded to Sylte.
ARGUMENT
Sylte initiated this proceeding because the Department’s Instructions incorrectly require
administration of Sylte’s 1875 water right based on the amount of natural tributary inflow to
Twin Lakes. To supply the 1875 right according to the plain language of the 1989 Decree, Sylte
is entitled to outflows from Twin Lakes to Rathdrum Creek in amounts up to the natural outflows
that existed when the 1875 right was appropriated. As found by Judge Magnuson, prior to the
construction the dam at Twin Lakes in 1906, outflows from Twin Lakes to Rathdrum Creek at
times exceeded Twin Lakes inflows. Accordingly, this Court must reverse the Instructions and
the Department’s and District Court’s decisions affirming the Instructions.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from a district court where the court was acting in its appellate capacity
under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, this Court reviews the decision of the district
court to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it. N. Snake Ground
Water Dist. v. IDWR, 160 Idaho 518, 522, 376 P.3d 722, 726 (2016). This Court reviews the
agency record independently of the district court’s decision. A reviewing court defers to the
agency’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and the agency’s factual
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determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence
before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence
in the record. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion. Id.
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) provides that the district court must affirm the agency action
unless it finds that the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. N. Snake Ground Water
Dist., 160 Idaho at 522, 376 P.3d at 726. Even if one of these conditions is met, an agency action
shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced. If the agency
action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further
proceedings as necessary. Id.
II.

THE 1989 DECREE IS RES JUDICATA AND EACH OF ITS PROVISIONS MUST BE
GIVEN FORCE AND EFFECT

The administration of water rights in WD 95C must adhere to the 1989 Decree.
However, the Instructions, the IDWR Order, and the Judicial Review Order improperly ignore
many of the 1989 Decree’s express findings and conclusions.
The doctrine of res judicata applies to the 1989 Decree. 9 A water rights decree is
“conclusive proof of diversion of the water, and of application of the water to beneficial use, i.e.,
9

“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action.” Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho
186, 190, 207 P.3d 162, 166-167 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n an action between the
same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not
only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter
which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.” Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch,
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the decree is res judicata as to the water rights at issue [in a subsequent proceeding].” Crow v.
Carlson, 107 Idaho 461, 465, 690 P.2d 916, 920 (1984), quoted in Mullinix v. Killgore’s Salmon
River Fruit Co., 158 Idaho 269, 277, 346 P.3d 286, 294 (2015). There is no exception to res
judicata that would relieve the 1989 Decree from its operation in this case.
Thus, the primary question in this appeal is: What does the 1989 Decree mean? The
answer to this question is in the 1989 Decree’s plain language, which must be read to give force
and effect to all of it in its entirety.
In Idaho, water decrees are interpreted “using the same interpretation rules that apply to
contracts.” Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 159 Idaho 798, 807, 367 P.3d 193, 202
(2016). Consequently, the intent of a decree is to be ascertained from the language of the decree
itself. Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. v. Summerwind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600, 610, 338 P.3d
1204, 1214 (2014).
A written instrument must be read “as a whole and [to] give meaning to all of its terms to
the extent possible.” Twin Lakes Vill. Prop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Crowley (“Twin Lakes”), 124 Idaho
132, 138, 857 P.2d 611, 617 (1993) (citing Magic Valley Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Prof'l Bus.
Servs., Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 565, 808 P.2d 1303, 1310 (1991)). “[V]arious provisions in a
contract must be construed, if possible, so to give force and effect to every part thereof.” Twin
Lakes, 124 Idaho at 137, 857 P.2d at 616.
Only if a decree is ambiguous should a Court look outside of its four corners. “In the
absence of ambiguity, a document must be construed by the meaning derived from the plain

123 Idaho 434, 437, 849 P.2d 107, 110 (1993). This Court has stated that “a valid and final judgment
rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions
out of which the cause of action arose.” Id. at 437, 849 P.2d at 110.
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wording of the instrument.” Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 166, 335 P.3d 1, 11 (2014);
see also Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 219, 192 P.3d 1036, 1043 (2008) (“In the absence of
ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to
the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Despite differing views as to what the 1989 Decree means, no one in these proceedings
has argued that the 1989 Decree is ambiguous. And neither the Department nor the District
Court found that it is. “In deciding whether a document is ambiguous, this Court must seek to
determine whether it is ‘reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation.’” Id. (quoting Bondy v.
Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1992)). “Ambiguity results when reasonable
minds might differ or be uncertain as to its meaning, however ambiguity is not established
merely because different possible interpretations are presented to a court.” McKay v. Boise
Project Bd. of Control, 141 Idaho 463, 469–70, 111 P.3d 148, 154–55 (2005). An ambiguity
exists only “[i]f there are two different reasonable interpretations of the [decree’s]
language . . . .” Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., 157 Idaho at 610, 338 P.3d at 1214.
Because the intent behind the 1989 Decree is clear from its language, the parties asked
the Department and District Court to determine its meaning as a matter of law. Farnsworth v.
Dairymen's Creamery Ass'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct. App. 1994) (“Thus,
where the parties’ intention is clear from the language of their contract, its interpretation and
legal effect are to be resolved by the court as a matter of law.”). In such cases, summary
judgment is appropriate. Id.; Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., 157 Idaho at 610, 338 P.3d at 1214. It is
only where a legal document cannot be understood from its own language that an issue of fact is
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created and extrinsic evidence may be examined. Farnsworth, 125 Idaho at 870, 876 P.2d at
152.
III.

SYLTE’S 1875 WATER RIGHT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE PRE-DAM OUTFLOW
RELEASED FROM TWIN LAKES, WHICH IS NOT LIMITED TO TWIN LAKES’
INFLOW.

Judge Magnuson’s detailed findings and conclusions about the nature of the Twin LakesRathdrum Creek water system and water right no. 95-0734 entitle Sylte to have the amount of
Twin Lakes’ natural, pre-dam outflow to Rathdrum Creek released from Twin Lakes to satisfy
Sylte’s 1875 water right. Judge Magnuson found that this pre-dam amount sometimes exceeded
the inflow to Twin Lakes, which necessarily means that the Instructions are incorrect to
administer Sylte’s 1875 right based on Twin Lakes inflow. Contrary to the Department’s and the
District Court’s decisions, Judge Magnuson did not conclude that water right no. 95-0734 is
limited to Twin Lakes’ natural tributary inflow.
A.

Prior to 1906, Twin Lakes’ outflows at times exceeded inflows.

Judge Magnuson found that the dam and outlet structure constructed around 1906 did not
artificially store a greater volume of water in Twin Lakes than was naturally stored prior to 1906.
Memorandum Decision at 10 (A.R. 182) (“The water level of Twin Lakes and the vegetation
lines around the lakes were relatively the same, both before and after the construction of the
dam.”). All the dam did was hold the same volume of water in Twin Lakes longer than it was
held prior to dam construction. Id. (“The primary result the dam had on the water level was to
hold the water at a higher point longer through the summer months.”)
This was recognized in Amended Proposed Findings’ Finding of Fact No. 10, which says
that all three “blocks” of water in Twin Lakes were natural lake storage prior to dam
construction, and striking language stating that the dam and outlet structure “provided the

APPELLANT SYLTE’S OPENING BRIEF –APPEAL NO. 46062 (OCT. 23, 2018)
14380981_15.doc / 13461-4

Page 25 of 49

capability to raise the level of the lakes.” Final Decree at xv-xvi (A.R. 201-02). See also supra
note 5 (describing the “blocks” of water in Twin Lakes).
These findings mean that the volume of water that filled Twin Lakes after the 1906 dam
construction was the same volume that naturally filled Twin Lakes prior to dam construction (i.e.
when Sylte’s 1875 right was established). They also mean that, prior to dam construction,
outflows from Twin Lakes at times exceeded inflows, thus lowering lake levels faster than after
the dam was constructed. Accordingly, contrary to the Instructions, the 1989 Decree does not
limit the exercise of Sylte’s 1875 water right to Twin Lakes’ inflows because the right was
appropriated when Twin Lakes outflows to Rathdrum Creek at times exceeded Twin Lakes’
inflows.
This relatively simple concept eluded the Department and the District Court. Basic
hydrology dictates that storage decreases (i.e. water levels decline) if outflow exceeds inflow.
Likewise, storage increases (i.e. water levels rise) if inflow exceeds outflow. In short, “the rate
of change of storage is the difference between the rate of inflow and the rate of outflow.” (R.
1306) (excerpt of Luna B. Leopold & Walter B. Langbein, A PRIMER ON WATER (“A Primer on
Water”), US DEP’T OF INTERIOR GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, at 22 (1960)). 10
This should be familiar to anyone with a sink or a bathtub: the water level rises when
you plug the drain and turn on the faucet, and the water level goes down when you pull the plug
and turn off the faucet. The following illustration from A Primer on Water depicts this
fundamental principle:

10

A Primer on Water is available online at https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/7000045/report.pdf. An
excerpt of its section on “River Channels and Floods” is in the Agency Record at A.R. 1306-07.
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than outflow:
siorage decreases

Infl'ow less

Inflow greater than outflow:
storage increases

A Primer on Water at 22 (R. at 1306).
According to Judge Magnuson’s findings, prior to 1906, Twin Lakes was like a bathtub
with a leaky drain plug at the outlet that allowed water to flow “through the natural pre-dam
obstruction at all times, forming the source waters of Rathdrum Creek.” Memorandum Decision
at 11 (A.R. 183) (underlining in original). And the 1906 dam was like a new leakproof drain
plug that served to hold the water at a higher level longer. Memorandum Decision at 10 (A.R.
182) (“The primary result the dam had on the water level was to hold the water at a higher point
longer through the summer months.”).
Thus, Judge Magnuson’s finding that Twin Lakes’ water level dropped (i.e., natural
storage decreased) faster during the summer months before the dam was constructed in 1906
means that the natural outflow from Twin Lakes during those periods was greater than the
natural inflow. The water levels dropped faster prior to 1906 because water that naturally filled
Twin Lakes gradually drained out to Rathdrum Creek during the summer months in excess of the
lakes’ inflow. Although the record does not suggest that inflow to Twin Lakes ever completely
ceased prior to 1906, it is reasonable to infer from Judge Magnuson’s findings that, so long as
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Twin Lakes had some water in it, Twin Lakes’ outflow to Rathdrum Creek would have
continued even if there had been no inflow at all. Memorandum Decision at 11 (A.R. 183) (“the
outlet waters of Twin Lakes flowed . . . through the natural pre-dam obstruction at all times,
forming the source waters of Rathdrum Creek” (underline in original)). See also A Primer on
Water at 22 (R. at 1306) (“[T]he outflow does not stop at the same moment that the inflow
ceases. . . . After the tributary inflow stops, that water which is in transit . . . gradually drains
out.”).
It may seem counterintuitive that a downstream senior could be entitled to have outflows
released in greater amounts than an on-stream reservoir’s inflows. But this simply is how the
Twin Lakes-Rathdrum Creek water system worked prior to the 1906 dam, where a natural
upstream reservoir existed when Sylte’s 1875 right was appropriated.
The result would be different in the case of a dam constructed on a stream where no
natural storage previously existed. In those cases, a new dam impounds all of the natural flow
that previously continued downstream to senior water right holders. Idaho water law requires
that such on-stream reservoirs bypass water to satisfy downstream senior water rights, but only
up to the amount of natural flow coming into the reservoir since that is all of the water that
would have flowed past the dam to the downstream senior had the dam not been constructed.
Thus, in such cases, releases to downstream senior water rights are properly limited to the
amount of natural tributary inflow into the reservoir.
But that is not the situation here. The natural conditions of Twin Lakes and Rathdrum
Creek included the impoundment of water in Twin Lakes and constant gradual outflow of water
to Rathdrum Creek in amounts sufficient to satisfy water right no. 95-0734 on a continuous yearround basis. Memorandum Decision at 11 (A.R. 183). That fact was conclusively found by
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Judge Magnuson, and it cannot be disputed now. See Rangen, 159 Idaho at 805, 367 P.3d at 200
(“By statute, ‘decree[s] entered in a general adjudication shall be conclusive as to the nature and
extent of all water rights in the adjudicated water system.’” (quoting I.C. § 42-1420(1)). Sylte’s
water right no. 95-0734 was appropriated under such conditions, when it was “always” served by
water in Rathdrum Creek “furnished from” Twin Lakes “on a continuous year-round basis.”
Memorandum Decision at 11-13 (A.R. 183-85).
In sum, Judge Magnuson’s express findings about the nature of Twin Lakes’ water level
fluctuations prior to and after the construction of the dam in 1906 dictates a conclusion that the
outflow from Twin Lakes at times exceeded the inflow to Twin Lakes. Accordingly, the
Instructions’ requirement that the distribution of water to Sylte’s 1875 water right is limited by
Twin Lakes’ inflow is incorrect, and the IDWR Order and Judicial Review Order affirming the
Instructions must be reversed.
B.

The Department’s and District Court’s decisions improperly give
junior water rights priority over Sylte’s 1875 water right.

The Department’s tributary inflow limitation on the exercise of Sylte’s 1875 right, which
was affirmed by the District Court, effectively and impermissibly puts junior water rights
(including the 1906 Storage Rights) in priority ahead of the 1875 right. This is contrary to Judge
Magnuson’s express conclusions:
The holders of water right #95-0734 are therefore entitled to waters from
the source of their appropriation on a basis of priority over those storage rights
Nos. 95-0974 and 95-0975. The waters of this basin are to be administered in
such manner as to give effect to such priority.
Memorandum Decision at 13 (A.R. 185). And it also is contrary to Idaho’s Prior Appropriation
Doctrine.
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It is axiomatic that “[p]riority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those
using the water.” Idaho Const. art. 15 § 3; see also I.C. § 42-106 (“As between appropriators,
the first in time is first in right.”). This Court has repeatedly enforced this fundamental principle.
“The rule in this state, both before and since the adoption of our constitution, is . . . that
he who is first in time is first in right.” Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 8, 156
P.3d 502, 509 (2007) (quoting Brossard v. Morgan, 7 Idaho 215, 219–20, 61 P. 1031, 1033
(1900)).
This principle protects seniors from injury caused by subsequent appropriators:
This court has uniformly adhered to the principle, announced both in the
Constitution and by the statute, that the first appropriator has the first right; and it
would take more than a theory, and in fact clear and convincing evidence, in any
given case, showing that the prior appropriator would not be injured or affected
by the diversion of a subsequent appropriator, before we would depart from a rule
so just and equitable in its application, and so generally and uniformly applied by
the courts.
Silkey v. Tiegs, 54 Idaho 126, 28 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1934) (quoting Moe v. Harger, 10 Idaho 302,
77 P. 645, 647 (1904)).
Similarly, a junior water user may not interfere with or alter a water course if doing so
prevents the natural flow of water from reaching a senior. “So soon as the prior appropriation
and right of use is established, it is clear, as a proposition of law, that the claimant is entitled to
have sufficient of the unappropriated waters flow down to his point of diversion to supply his
right, and an injunction against interference therewith is proper protective relief to be granted.”
Moe v. Harger, 10 Idaho 302, 77 P. at 647.
In other words, Idaho law uniformly protects a senior from the acts of juniors that change
the conditions under which the senior right was appropriated. “Each junior appropriator is
entitled to divert water only at such times as all prior appropriators are being supplied under their
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appropriations under conditions as they existed at the time the appropriation was made.”
Beecher v. Cassia Creek Irr. Co., Inc., 66 Idaho 1, 12, 154 P.2d 507, 510 (1944).
Judge Magnuson expressly recognized this principle in his Memorandum Decision:
An appropriator is entitled to maintenance of stream conditions
substantially as they were at the time the appropriators made their appropriation,
if a change in stream conditions would result in interference with the proper
exercise of the right. Bennett v. Nourse, 22 Ida. 249, 125 P. 1038 (1912). At the
time the appropriation (No. 95-0734) was made in 1875, there was always water
in Rathdrum Creek to serve said water right.
The holders of water right #95-0734 are therefore entitled to waters from
the source of their appropriation on a basis of priority over those storage rights
Nos. 95-0974 and 95-0975. The waters of this basin are to be administered in
such manner as to give effect to such priority.
Memorandum Decision at 13 (A.R. 185) (underlining in original). 11
Judge Magnuson included the Bennett v. Nourse principle immediately before
pronouncing that there was “always water in Rathdrum Creek” to serve water right no. 95-0734
when it was appropriated in 1875, that the water right is entitled to water “on a basis of priority”
over the 1906 Storage Rights, and that water must be administered to give effect to Sylte’s 1875
priority. Memorandum Decision at 13 (A.R. 185). The clear meaning behind these findings and
conclusions in succession is that Judge Magnuson intended for water right no. 95-0734 to be
protected from interference by changes in stream conditions caused by junior water rights such
as the 1906 Storage Rights.
This conclusion is clear from Judge Magnuson’s plain language, and it is consistent with
nearly a century of this Court’s precedent protecting downstream seniors from upstream juniors.

11

Although Bennett v. Nourse involved a junior seeking protection from seniors, the principle in
that case cited by Judge Magnuson also protects senior rights from interference by juniors. See, e.g.,
Arkoosh v. Big Wood Canal Co., 48 Idaho 383, 283 P. 522, 526 (1929).
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For example, in Carey Lake Reservoir Co. v. Strunk, 39 Idaho 332, 227 P. 591, 593
(1924)—a case cited by Judge Magnuson in the Memorandum Decision at 14-15 (A.R. 18687)—this Court agreed with the downstream senior’s argument that “by virtue of being prior
appropriators, they had the right to have at least the quantity of water to which they were entitled
flow down to them uninterrupted, and that, if this flow were interfered with by respondent’s dam,
they had a right to themselves cut the dam, to such an extent as to allow them to obtain their
water . . . .”
Similarly, in Arkoosh—a case involving a claim by senior natural flow water right
holders against upstream junior storage right holders—this Court held that the junior upstream
storage rights “may be exercised so long as [downstream senior right holders] have at their
headgates, during the irrigation season, the amount of water to which they are entitled under their
appropriations as the same would have naturally flowed in the natural stream prior to the
construction [of the junior’s system].” Arkoosh, 48 Idaho 383, 283 P. at 526-27 (1929) (Baker,
J., on rehearing).
And in Weeks v. McKay, 85 Idaho 617, 622, 382 P.2d 788, 791 (1963), this Court held
that “[o]ne who undertakes to change the natural channel of a stream or by means of dams or
otherwise increases or diminishes the flow of a stream must exercise care in so doing and take
such precautions as to prevent injury to others.” Similar to this case, the junior priority
defendant in Weeks constructed a dam upstream of the senior priority plaintiff. The Weeks Court
ordered that the junior defendant’s dam was required “to permit the same amount of water to
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escape from the lake and proceed down [the creek] to [plaintiff’s] diversion point as would occur
if its channel had remained unchanged.” Weeks, 85 Idaho at 623-24, 382 P.2d at 791-92. 12
Citing Weeks, this Court in Ward v. Kidd, 87 Idaho 216, 226, 392 P.2d 183, 189-90
(1964), held that an upstream junior dam owner could not “obstruct the flow” when “the water, if
unobstructed, would reach [the downstream senior’s] land . . . .” The Ward Court held that the
downstream senior “was entitled to have it flow uninterrupted.” Id. at 226, 392 P.2d at 189. The
Ward Court also remarked that the senior’s relatively small water rights “were valuable rights.
The law cannot countenance the invasion of a right merely because it is small. The holder of
such a right is entitled to its protection to the same extent as if it were of greater magnitude.” Id.
at 227, 392 P.2d at 190.
In short, Idaho law simply does not give an upstream junior water user the right to take or
interfere with a downstream senior’s natural flow. 13 Judge Magnuson recognized this, and his
findings and conclusions are consistent with this. Memorandum Decision at 13 (A.R. 185) (“The
holders of water right #95-0734 are therefore entitled to waters from the source of their
appropriation on a basis of priority over those storage rights Nos. 95-0974 and 95-0975. The
waters of this basin are to be administered in such manner as to give effect to such priority.”)
Thus, as between Sylte’s 1875 water right and other water rights on the Twin Lakes-Rathdrum
12

One significant difference between this case and Weeks is that Weeks involved a dam
constructed on a stream where no impoundment previously existed. As discussed above in Section III.A,
in this case a dam was built at the outlet of an existing natural lake formation.
13

The District Court mischaracterized Sylte’s argument as contending that the 1989 Decree is
contrary to Idaho’s prior appropriation doctrine. Judicial Review Decision at 9 (R. 234) (“principles of
res judicata preclude the Petitioners from asserting the Decree’s plain language is contrary to the doctrine
of prior appropriation.”). Sylte, in fact, contends (as it has throughout these proceedings) that the plain
language of the 1989 Decree protects Sylte’s 1875 right from interference by juniors, consistent with
Idaho’s prior appropriation doctrine. It is the Department’s Instructions and IDWR Order that Sylte
contends are contrary to the 1989 Decree and Idaho’s prior appropriation doctrine.
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Creek system (all of which are junior), Sylte’s senior priority date guarantees that their 1875
right will be satisfied before any others.
To give effect to the 1875 right’s senior priority, it must be satisfied ahead of the 1906
Storage Rights. This means that, when the 1906 Storage Rights are “filling” during their
authorized period of November 1 to March 31, they must continue to bypass water (up to the
amount of pre-dam natural outflow) sufficient to satisfy water right no. 95-0734. Likewise,
during the rest of the year, sufficient water (up to the amount of pre-dam natural outflow) must
continue to outflow into Rathdrum Creek to satisfy water right no. 95-0734. Only then will the
1875 right’s priority be given effect, as required by Judge Magnuson’s express findings and
conclusions and Idaho law.
The 1906 Storage Right holders are allowed to keep water in Twin Lakes longer than it
naturally was held prior to dam construction, but they are not entitled to retain water to the extent
that, absent reservoir operations and diversions, it would have naturally flowed down Rathdrum
Creek to satisfy right no. 95-0734. The contrary view, which is reflected in the Department’s
and District Court’s decisions, improperly gives upstream junior water rights priority over water
right no. 95-0734. As Judge Magnuson put it, “[t]o accept the [D]epartment’s interpretation of
the facts as they pertain to the 1875 Sylte water right (#95-0734), would be to deprive the holders
of such right of the use of the water to which they are entitled and to which use they have a prior
right to those possessing the storage rights.” Memorandum Decision at 14 (A.R. 186).
C.

Sylte is not asserting a claim to the artificially stored waters in Twin
Lakes.

Sylte’s argument that it is entitled to Twin Lakes’ natural pre-dam outflow is not an
argument that Sylte is entitled to the 1906 Storage Rights’ stored waters, as wrongly suggested
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by the Department and the District Court. (See, e.g. R. 233 (“the Decree did not award the
Petitioners any right to divert the lakes’ storage waters”).
Sylte acknowledges the distinction between storage rights and natural (or “direct”) flow
water rights. In addition, Sylte recognizes that Judge Magnuson decreed only two storage rights
on the system (the 1906 Storage Rights) and that the 1989 Decree does not award Sylte any right
to divert water stored under those storage rights. However, by virtue of the senior priority
Sylte’s 1875 right holds over those storage rights (and all other rights), and the fact that all of the
water stored under the 1906 Storage Rights was natural lake storage prior to the dam’s
construction, Sylte is entitled to releases of what used to be natural lake storage in amounts up to
what had naturally flowed out of Twin Lakes’ when the right was appropriated in 1875. In other
words, the water that naturally flowed out of Twin Lakes in 1875 necessarily is water that was
naturally stored in Twin Lakes in 1875, and this water is legally (if not factually) distinguishable
from the water that is artificially stored under the 1906 Storage Rights.
The Department’s and the District Court’s conclusions that the 1989 Decree (in particular
Conclusion of Law No. 14 14) prohibits Sylte from requiring the release of “stored waters” in
Twin Lakes fails to recognize that the “natural flow” to which Sylte’s 1875 right is entitled
14

The Department’s and District Court’s conclusions that Sylte is not entitled to Twin Lakes’
“stored waters” focus on the second sentence in Conclusion of Law No. 14 of the Amended Proposed
Findings, which states:
When seepage and evaporation losses from Twin Lakes exceed the total natural
tributary inflow to Twin Lakes, no water will be released from the lakes to satisfy
downstream water rights, with the exception of Water Right No. 95-0734. When this
occurs, Water Right No. 95-0734 and water rights that divert from Twin Lakes and from
the tributaries to Twin Lakes may divert the natural flow, but not the stored waters, on the
basis of water right priority.
Final Decree at xix (A.R. 205) (underlining in original Amended Proposed Findings to depict
IDWR’s amendment to Proposed Findings).
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includes the water that was naturally stored in Twin Lakes prior to dam construction. The
Department’s and District Court’s positions disregard, and cannot be reconciled with, Judge
Magnuson’s many findings and conclusions about the pre-dam conditions in Twin Lakes and
Rathdrum Creek:
•

that all of the water stored under the 1906 Storage Rights was the “natural lake
storage.” Final Decree at xv-xvi (A.R. 201-02) (Amended Proposed Findings’
Finding of Fact No. 10).

•

that there was “always” sufficient water in Rathdrum Creek to serve Sylte’s 1875
water right on a “continuous year-round basis” when it was appropriated.
Memorandum Decision at 13 (A.R. 185).

•

that such water was “furnished from” Twin Lakes. Memorandum Decision at 11
(A.R. 183).

•

that appropriators (such as Sylte) are “entitled to maintenance of stream
conditions as they were at the time” of their appropriation. Memorandum
Decision at 13 (A.R. 185).

•

that the holders of water right no. 95-0734 are entitled to water “on a basis of
priority” over the 1906 Storage Rights. Memorandum Decision at 13 (A.R. 185).

and,
•

that water rights administration must “give effect” to 95-0734’s priority over the
1906 Storage Rights. Memorandum Decision at 13 (A.R. 185).

Sylte’s reading of the 1989 Decree gives force and effect to those findings and
conclusions and can be reconciled with all other parts of the 1989 Decree, including Conclusion
of Law No. 14 whose “natural flow” language must be read to include Twin Lakes’ pre-dam
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natural outflow furnished by the pre-dam natural storage to which Sylte is entitled. Twin Lakes,
124 Idaho at 138, 857 P.2d at 617 (stating that a written instrument must be read “as a whole and
[to] give meaning to all of its terms to the extent possible.”) And its “stored waters” language
must be read to mean the artificially stored waters under the 1906 Storage Rights. Reading
Conclusion of Law No. 14 to prohibit Sylte to all of the natural flow that existed in 1875 (even if
some of it was later appropriated by the 1906 Storage Rights) does not give force and effect to
the entire 1989 Decree.
Because the natural flow to which Sylte is entitled includes water naturally stored in
Twin Lakes prior to dam construction (and not water stored under the 1906 Storage Rights),
Sylte does not, as the District Court states, “argue that conclusion of law 12 opens the door or
creates ambiguity as to whether water right 95-734 may divert storage water.” Judicial Review
Decision at 8 (R. 233). After acknowledging the 1906 Storage Rights are the only storage rights
on the system, Conclusion of Law No. 12 states that “[a]ll other water rights with source of Twin
Lakes Tributary to Rathdrum Creek are direct flow water rights and are entitled to divert , on the
basis of priority, a combined rate of flow equal to the inflow to the lakes.” Final Decree at xix
(A.R. 205) (underlining added). By its terms, however, this provision does not apply to Sylte’s
1875 water right, which has a source of Rathdrum Creek tributary to Sinks. The District Court
improperly ignored this plain language and dismissed this distinction, despite ostensibly focusing
its own analysis on the 1989 Decree’s “plain language.” If plain language is the rule—and it
is—there is no reason to believe Conclusion of Law No. 12 means anything other than what it
says.
And, contrary to the District Court’s reasoning that it “does not address water rights with
a source of Rathdrum Creek because to do so would be unnecessary and redundant” (R. 233), it
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only makes sense to conclude that the exclusion of Rathdrum Creek rights from this provision
was intentional. Conclusion of Law No. 12 only addresses Twin Lakes sourced water rights—
which are the vast majority of water rights on the system. See Proposed Findings at 19-85 (A.R.
43-109). There is no reason to think that Conclusion of Law No. 12 applies to natural flow rights
with different sources, as suggested by the District Court. 15 In any case, Conclusion of Law No.
12’s general language about “direct flow water rights” should not trump Judge Magnuson’s
specific and express findings about Sylte’s 1875 water right. Morgan v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 518, 201 P.2d 976, 983 (1948) (“Special provisions will control over
general ones where both relate to the same thing.”).
D.

This case is not about increased evaporation and seepage, it is about
decreased seepage.

Citing Conclusion of Law No. 14’s first sentence, the District Court agreed with the
Department that the 1989 Decree gave Sylte’s 1875 right “a unique administrative status relative
to other natural flow rights on the system located downstream from Twin Lakes.” Judicial
Review Decision at 6 (R. 231). That is, the District Court found that “increased seepage and
evaporation is not counted against the natural tributary inflow the right is entitled to divert.” Id.
In the view of the Department and the District Court, this exemption from Twin Lakes’
evaporation and seepage is Sylte’s sole benefit of being senior. They are only half right, at most.
First, for the reasons already explained, any additional evaporation and seepage in Twin
Lakes resulting from the dam’s impoundment of water must not be “counted against” Sylte’s
1875 right because Sylte’s appropriation pre-dates the dam and therefore is protected from
15

For example, Conclusion of Law No. 12 would make no sense if applied to water right no. 950966 (R. 37), whose source is Spring Branch Creek tributary to Rathdrum Creek, and which obviously is
located downstream from Twin Lakes outlet and is uninfluenced by Twin Lake’s inflows or outflows.
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interference by the dam. See e.g., Weeks, 85 Idaho at 622, 382 P.2d at 791 (“[o]ne who
undertakes to change the natural channel of a stream or by means of dams or otherwise increases
or diminishes the flow of a stream must exercise care in so doing and take such precautions as to
prevent injury to others.”). 16 The District Court and the Department got this part right.
What they failed to recognize is that Sylte’s 1875 right also must not be impacted from
decreased seepage that resulted from the 1906 dam—that is, the seepage that historically
furnished water to Rathdrum Creek. Judge Magnuson’s finding that water flowed “through the
natural pre-dam obstruction at all times, forming the source waters for Rathdrum Creek ”
Memorandum Decision at 11 (A.R. 183) (underline in original), essentially recognized that water
seeped out of Twin Lakes into Rathdrum Creek. And Judge Magnuson further recognized that
the 1906 dam reduced this seepage and held the water “at a higher point longer through the
summer months.” Memorandum Decision at 10 (A.R. 182).
As already discussed, the 1989 Decree protects Sylte from this reduction in seepage from
Twin Lakes. Memorandum Decision at 13 (A.R. 185) (“The holders of water right #95-0734 are
therefore entitled to waters from the source of their appropriation on a basis of priority over those
storage rights Nos. 95-0974 and 95-0975. The waters of this basin are to be administered in such
manner as to give effect to such priority.”). This is consistent with Idaho law. Weeks, 85 Idaho
at 623-24, 382 P.2d at 791-92 (a junior dam must “permit the same amount of water to escape

16

Although one might wonder about Twin Lakes’ evaporation and seepage conditions when
Sylte’s 1875 right was appropriated, there is no need to determine those here. The only question to
answer in That answer depends only on whether, in 1875, Twin Lakes’ outflows at times exceeded its
inflows. As already discussed, Judge Magnuson’s express findings indicate that they did. Whatever
evaporation and seepage conditions might have existed in 1875 are irrelevant to that question.
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from the lake and proceed down [the creek] to [the senior’s] diversion point as would occur if its
channel had remained unchanged”).
To be clear, Sylte must accept whatever evaporation and seepage conditions existed when
Sylte’s 1875 right was appropriated. But the 1989 Decree and Idaho law protect Sylte from
increased evaporation and seepage as well as decreased Twin Lakes’ seepage that benefitted
Sylte’s 1875 right—that is, decreases to the outflow that fed Rathdrum Creek at all times through
the natural pre-dam obstruction.
E.

The futile call doctrine’s application to water right no. 95-0734 is not
dependent on Twin Lakes’ tributary inflow.

Sylte challenged the Instructions’ futile call procedure, which requires a futile call
determination “[i]f release of all the natural tributary inflow does not satisfy delivery of water
right no. 95-734 within a 48-hr period.” Instructions at 2 ¶ 7 (R. at 211). Sylte contended this
procedure violates the 1989 Decree because, as already discussed, the delivery of water to water
right no. 95-0734 is not limited by the amount of natural tributary inflow to Twin Lakes.
The Department and District Court upheld this part of the Instructions, each one stating
that no right is “immune” from the doctrine. IDWR Order at 13 (A.R. 1402); Judicial Review
Decision at 10 (R. 235). 17

17

The IDWR Order contained an analysis which was not addressed by the District Court, but is
worth mentioning here so this Court understands why it is wrong. Citing this Court’s decision in SRBA
Basin Wide Issue 17, In re SRBA, 157 Idaho 385, 336 P.3d 792 (2014) (“BW 17”), the IDWR Order
improperly relied on the Director’s “discretion” in “balancing” the administration of water rights to justify
the Instructions’ futile call procedure. IDWR Order at 12-13 (A.R. 1401-02). But the Department
ignored the BW 17 Court’s admonition that the Director’s discretion to choose accounting methodologies
is constrained by water right decrees and Idaho’s priority system. BW 17, 157 Idaho at 393, 336 P.3d at
800 (“the Director cannot distribute water however he pleases at any time in any way; he must follow the
law. . . . “[A]s long as the Director distributes water in accordance with prior appropriation, he meets his
clear legal duty.”); id. at 394; 336 P.3d at 801 (“[T]he Director’s duty to administer water according to
technical expertise is governed by water right decrees. The decrees give the Director a quantity he must
provide to each water user in priority.”). The Director simply does not have discretion to pick a junior
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Sylte does not contend that the futile call doctrine is inapplicable to its 1875 right.
Rather, as it has throughout these proceedings, Sylte contends that the Instructions misapply the
doctrine to Sylte’s 1875 right by using the improper inflow limitation already discussed. If, as
Sylte argues above, its 1875 right is entitled to have the pre-dam natural outflow released from
Twin Lakes rather than merely the inflow, the inescapable conclusion is that the Department
cannot apply the futile call doctrine based on whether the release of inflow will reach Sylte’s
diversion.
The Idaho Supreme Court has described the futile call doctrine this way:
As a rule, the law of water rights in this state embodies a policy against
the waste of irrigation water. Such policy is not to be construed, however, so as
to permit an upstream junior appropriator to interfere with the water right of a
downstream senior appropriator so long as the water flowing in its natural
channels would reach the point of downstream diversion. We agree that if due
to seepage, evaporation, channel absorption or other conditions beyond the
control of the appropriators the water in the stream will not reach the point of
the prior appropriator in sufficient quantity for him to apply it to beneficial use,
then a junior appropriator whose diversion point is higher on the stream may
divert the water.
Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 739, 552 P.2d 1220, 1224 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
Applying the Gilbert Court’s analysis here, the state’s policy against waste must not be
construed to permit upstream junior water rights to interfere with the delivery of water to Sylte’s

water right over a senior water right. Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 739, 552 P.2d 1220, 1224 (1976)
(the state’s policy against waste “is not to be construed, however, so as to permit an upstream junior
appropriator to interfere with the water right of a downstream senior appropriator so long as the water
flowing in its natural channels would reach the point of downstream diversion.”).
In any case, any suggestion that delivering water to water right no. 95-0734 is wasteful cannot be
reconciled with the Department’s prior determination that “it is not in the interest of the local public to
dry up the channel of Rathdrum Creek downstream of the [Twin Lakes dam] control structure.”
Proposed Memorandum Decision and Order at 5, In the Matter of Application for Transfer No. 2745 of
Water Right No. 95-0973 and 95-2059 filed by the United States of America, acting through the Regional
Director, Bureau of Reclamation (Jun. 26, 1984) (R. at 1189).
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1875 water right so long as the natural flow of water (i.e. Twin Lakes’ pre-dam natural outflow)
in its natural channels would reach the 1875 right’s point of diversion. Sylte is entitled to have
the pre-dam amount of natural flow continue in Rathdrum Creek’s natural channel as it did in
1875, and to be subject to the futile call doctrine under Gilbert only if, due to seepage,
evaporation, channel absorption or other conditions beyond the control of the appropriators, such
water will not reach water right no. 95-0734’s point of diversion in sufficient quantity to apply to
beneficial use.
Accordingly, because releases of water from Twin Lakes to satisfy Sylte’s 1875 right are
not limited by the amount of inflow to Twin Lakes, the futile call procedures set forth in the
Instructions and upheld by the IDWR Order and Judicial Review Decision must be rejected.
IV.

THE DEPARTMENT’S IMPROPER PROCEDURES PREJUDICED SYLTE’S SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS.
In addition to the matters addressed above, the Department erred when, in determining

Sylte’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling, it (1) relied on documents not in the record, and (2) sua
sponte added a volume limitation provision to the Instructions. The District Court did not
address whether these actions were proper, instead deciding that Sylte was not entitled to relief
because its substantial rights were not prejudiced. Judicial Review Decision at 10-11 (R. 23536). In the next two subsections, Sylte addresses why the Department and the District Court
were wrong.
A.

The Department’s improper reliance on documents outside the record
violated Sylte’s substantial rights.

A “substantial right” includes both substantive rights as well as procedural due process
rights. 917 Lusk, LLC v. City of Boise, 158 Idaho 12, 18-19, 343 P.3d 41, 47-48 (2015)
(substantial rights include harm to property); Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36, 244
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P.3d 174, 180 (2010) (“due process rights are substantial rights”). The IDWR Order improperly
cited and quoted documents not in the agency record. Doing so violated Sylte’s due process
right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond, as well as the Department’s Rules of
Procedure.
First, the Department quoted Sylte’s predecessor-in-interest’s Objection to Proposed
Findings of Water Rights (“Sylte’s Objection”), filed March 20, 1985, in the proceedings before
Judge Magnuson. IDWR Order at 6 (A.R. 1395). 18 Second, the Department cited and quoted the
Department’s own Notice of Entry of Final Decree (“IDWR’s Notice”) filed after Judge
Magnuson’s Final Decree was entered. IDWR Order at 9 (A.R. 1398). The Department had no
legal basis to cite, quote, or rely upon either of these documents which were not in the agency
record below (and are not in the record on appeal).
The Department did not find any ambiguity in the 1989 Decree that would justify looking
outside its four corners. “In the absence of ambiguity, a document must be construed by the
meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument.” Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho
156, 166, 335 P.3d 1, 11 (2014). Indeed, the IDWR Order’s only comment as to whether the
1989 Decree might be ambiguous was with respect to Conclusion of Law No. 14, which the
IDWR Order determines is “unambiguous.” IDWR Order at 10 (A.R. 1399).
No party put these documents in this agency record, the Department did not take official
notice of either under Rule of Procedure 602 (IDAPA 37.01.01.602), and no party received
notice of them or was given an opportunity to contest or rebut them before the issuance of the
IDWR Order. Notice and an opportunity to contest or rebut officially noticed evidence is
18

Sylte’s predecessor-in-interest that filed the objection included John and Evelyn Sylte, Gordon
and Judith Sylte, and Sylte Ranch, Inc.
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required under IDWR’s rules. IDAPA 37.01.01.602. And IDWR may only base its decision on
the official agency record. IDAPA 37.01.01.650 (“The agency shall maintain an official record
for each contested case and (unless statute provides otherwise) base its decision in a contested
case on the official record for the case.”); 37.01.01.712.01 (“Findings of fact must be based
exclusively on the evidence in the record of the contested case and on matters officially noticed
in that proceeding.”). Accordingly, it was error for the Department to review and quote from
off-record documents in the IDWR Order’s findings and conclusions. The Department’s review
and quotation of (and apparent reliance on) these documents violated Idaho law, the
Department’s Rules of Procedure, and Sylte’s due process right to notice and a meaningful
opportunity to respond.
This was prejudicial to Sylte because the documents actually do not support the
conclusions reached by the IDWR. Had they been properly put in the record, Sylte could have
had an opportunity to explain their meaning including, if necessary, by introducing other
evidence into the record. The Department’s failure to provide Sylte with notice that the
Department would review and cite the documents deprived Sylte of this opportunity, and this
prejudiced Sylte’s substantial rights.
To avoid any appearance that Sylte is attempting to hide the contents of Sylte’s Objection
and IDWR’s Notice, they are quoted length in the record. (R. 105-07 (Sylte’s Objection); A.R.
1431 (IDWR’s Notice)). Sylte will not quote them again here, but invites this Court to read those
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document’s text and Sylte’s full explanation of that text.19 In an nutshell, neither document
supports IDWR’s conclusions in the IDWR Order.
The Department mischaracterized Sylte’s Objection by selectively quoting from it, and
implying (if not asserting outright) that Judge Magnuson rejected the same arguments Sylte is
making in this proceeding. IDWR Order at 6-8 (A.R. 1395-97). However, contrary to the
Department’s view, Judge Magnuson agreed with Sylte and expressly rejected the Department’s
contentions in favor of Sylte’s. Memorandum Decision at 14 (A.R. 186) (“[t]o accept the
[D]epartment’s interpretation of the facts as they pertain to the 1875 Sylte water right (#950734), would be to deprive the holders of such right of the use of the water to which they are
entitled and to which use they have a prior right to those possessing the storage rights.”).
Concerning IDWR’s Notice, it simply cannot be relied on to accurately reflect the
meaning of the 1989 Decree. IDWR’s Notice was filed by the Department after the entry of the
Memorandum Decision and Final Decree. It is not a statement by Judge Magnuson, and
therefore it has no bearing on the meaning of the 1989 Decree. At most, it is a self-serving, post
hoc restatement of the Department’s own arguments that were rejected by Judge Magnuson.
Indeed, there was no reason for IDWR’s Notice to include the statements cited by the IDWR
Order other than to place a stake in the ground should the Department want to later re-assert the
positions rejected by Judge Magnuson. Judge Magnuson made a number of findings and

19

In offering argument concerning Sylte’s Objection and IDWR’s Notice, Sylte in no way admits
that additional documents are needed to interpret the 1989 Decree. The 1989 Decree’s plain language
unambiguously supports Sylte’s arguments, and there is no reason to look outside its four corners.
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conclusions about a number of matters, making it odd (to say the least) that IDWR would single
out and offer its further explanation concerning only water right no. 95-0734. 20
In short, the IDWR Order should not have cited, quoted, or relied on any documents not
in the record, and certainly should not have cherry-picked self-serving statements outside the
four corners of the 1989 Decree. Contrary to the District Court’s determination, doing so was
prejudicial to Sylte’s substantial rights and must be reversed.
B.

The Department erred by sua sponte adding an incorrect volume limitation
provision to the Instructions.

Sylte challenged the IDWR Order because, without any party asking and without it being
an issue presented in this proceeding, the Department improperly added to the Instructions a
volume limitation provision concerning water right no. 95-0734. IDWR Order at 11, 13 (A.R.
1400, 1402). The District Court found that this did not prejudice Sylte’s substantial rights.
Judicial Review Decision at 10 (R. 235). Sylte requested rehearing by the District Court on this
single issue, which was denied. (R. 239-52, 278-81). This was error because adding the volume
limitation was outside the issues raised in this proceeding and because it mischaracterized
whatever volume limitation must be imposed on water right 95-0734.
No party raised the issue of water right no. 95-0734’s volume limitation at any point in
this proceeding. As already discussed, this proceeding was brought by Sylte to challenge the
Instructions’ provisions limiting the exercise of water right no. 95-0734 to Twin Lakes’ natural

20

For example, Judge Magnuson made findings and conclusions about the nature of the natural
lake storage prior to the dam and outlet construction, and also the nature of an unnamed stream that was
tributary to Rathdrum Creek immediately below Twin Lakes’ outlet prior to the dam and outlet
construction. But IDWR’s Notice makes no mention of such other findings.
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tributary inflow. Sylte had no notice of that IDWR would add the volume limitation language to
the Instructions or any opportunity to address it. 21
Moreover, even if this was an appropriate issue to address in this proceeding, the
Department incorrectly determined how a volume limit should be administered. According to
the 1989 Decree, Sylte’s water right no. 95-0734 is entitled to divert 4.10 acre-feet per year in
priority. (R .at 26). The IDWR Order, on the other hand, limits the exercise of water right no.
95-0734 to “unless or until the maximum annual diversion volume of 4.1 acre feet has been
delivered.” Order at 13 (R. at 1402) (emphasis added). Sylte’s water right no. 95-0734 is
entitled to divert 4.10 acre-feet per year in priority (i.e., not counting excess water diverted under
so-called “free river” conditions), not merely to have that amount delivered to their point of
diversion. Sylte is entitled to have water delivered to water right no. 95-0734’s point of
diversion on a continuous year-round basis, only to be curtailed when the right has diverted the
volume limit in priority. 22
“Procedural due process is the aspect of due process relating to the minimal requirements
of notice and a hearing if the deprivation of a significant life, liberty, or property interest may
21

On rehearing, the District Court stated that Sylte had “both notice and an opportunity to he
heard on the issue of a 4.1 acre-foot volume limitation in the prior adjudication.” Rehearing Denial at 2
(unnumbered) (R. 279). But Sylte is not in this case challenging the volume limitation in the 1989
Decree, they are challenging the sua sponte imposition of the volume limitation by the Department in the
agency proceedings underlying this appeal.
22

On rehearing, the District Court decided that “diverted” versus “delivered” is a “distinction
without a difference under the circumstances” because, at oral argument, the Department’s counsel
confirmed that, despite the “delivered” language in the Instructions, the Department did not intend to
administer Sylte’s water right based on the amount of water that flows to and/or past Sylte’s headgate.
Rehearing Denial at 3 (unnumbered) (R. 280); Tr. 34-35 (“it’s not the amount delivered to the point of—
or that flows past the point of diversion, but simply the amount diverted, delivered to the place of use, and
put to beneficial use.”). While this provides Sylte with some solace, it does not change the fact the
Instructions still contain the “delivered” language when that language does not accurately describe how
Sylte’s 1875 right should be administered.
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occur.” Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001). With
neither notice nor opportunity to be heard regarding the Department’s sua sponte addition of a
volume limit to the Instructions, the Department’s Order deprived Sylte of a significant property
right in violation of Sylte’s due process rights.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Sylte respectfully requests that this Court: (1) reverse
and set aside the District Court’s Judicial Review Order, the IDWR Order, and the Department’s
Instructions; (2) hold that Sylte is entitled to releases of water from Twin Lakes in the amount of
Twin Lakes’ pre-dam natural outflow rather than the amount of natural tributary inflow entering
Twin Lakes; (3) determine that the Department prejudiced Sylte’s substantial rights by reviewing
and citing documents outside the agency record and by sua sponte adding a volume limitation to
the Instructions; and (4) awarding Sylte its attorney fees and costs on appeal and in the
proceedings below.
Respectfully submitted on October 23, 2018.
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